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Introduction
The Reagan Administration considers verifiability of Soviet compli-
ance to be an essential feature of any arms control agreement it would be
willing to make with the Soviet Union.1 While numerous methods of
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1. See START in a Historical Perspective, address by Edward L. Rowney, chief negotiator
to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), before the Kiwanis Club, Atlanta, Georgia
(Apr. 10, 1984), reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 563, at 2 (Apr. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter Rowney]. See generally Perle, What is Adequate Verfication?, in SALT II AND
AMERICAN SECURITY 53 (1980); Note, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1059.
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arms control verification exist,2 on-site inspections might be a means of
ensuring that all parties are strictly observing the provisions of an agree-
ment. 3 As a result, Reagan Administration arms control negotiators
have pressed the Soviets to agree to on-site inspections in several of the
agreements under discussion. 4 In addition to the Soviet Union's histori-
cal opposition to on-site inspection, based in part upon fears of espio-
nage,5 the U.S. Constitution's limitations on governmental power are
also potential obstacles to on-site inspection in this country. The purpose
of this article is to examine the constitutionality of on-site inspections as
contained in one of these agreements-the Draft Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons (Draft Convention).6
The Draft Convention, presented by the United States to the multilat-
eral Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, on April 18,
1984, is the most far-reaching Reagan Administration proposal for on-
2. See Krepon, Arms-Treaty Verification: A Political Problem, Technology Review, May-
June 1986, at 34, 46-47 (discussing both advanced monitoring techniques and cooperative
measures as alternative means of verification). See generally Heckrotte, A Soviet View of Verifi-
cation, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1986, at 12 (discussing Soviet reluctance to
submit to "intrusive" verification measures); Newcombe and Newcombe, Chemical and Bio-
logical Weapons Inspection, PEACE RESEARCH REVIEWS, MAY 1982, at 55 (comprehensive
review and bibliography of proposals that have been advanced for verification inspections pur-
suant to treaties regulating chemical and biological weapons).
3. See R. SHEARER, JR., ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR ARMS CONTROL: BREAKING THE
VERIFICATION BARRIER 27 (1984). But see Lord, Rethinking On-Site Inspection In U.S. Arms
Control Policy, STRATEGIC REv., Spring 1985, at 45.
4. See Rowney, supra note 1.
5. M. KREPON, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 33 (Foreign Policy
Ass'n., Headline Series No. 270, Sept.-Oct. 1984); see Adam, Peacekeeping by Technical
Means, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 1986, at 42, 44 & 66. The Soviet Union had accepted on-site
verification inspections in the Protocol to the still-unratified Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty. Protocol to the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,
May 28, 1976, United States-USSR, art. III-VII, reprinted in 74 Dep't St. Bull. 804, 805-11
(1976). This heretofore isolated instance appears to have become a trend. On September 22,
1986, the Soviets consented to on-site inspections as part of an agreement intended to reduce
the risk of military confrontation in Europe. Borawski, Accord at Stockholm, 42 BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 34, 35-36 (1986). On December 8, 1987, the Soviet Union agreed to
on-site inspections to verify the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Message From the Presi-
dent of the United States Transmitting the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, Together With the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols, Signed at
Washington on Dec. 8, 1987, Treaty Doc. No. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), at art. XI(l)
[hereinafter Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty]. Further, the Soviets have reportedly indi-
cated a willingness to accommodate on-site inspections in the context of a comprehensive nu-
clear weapons test ban treaty and mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. M. KREPON,
supra at 34.
6. U.S. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, submitted to the Con-
ference on Disarmament, April 18, 1984 [hereinafter Draft Convention], reprinted in United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 269-99
(1984) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT].
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site inspection. 7 Sometimes called the "poor state's weapons of mass de-
struction," chemical weapons-already banned in wartime by the" Ge-
neva Protocol of 1925 8-are considered by the Reagan Administration to
be undergoing a resurgence in use that demands additional international
regulation.9
In a 1984 speech to the Conference, Vice President George Bush
pointed out that chemical weapons pose a basic dilemma for interna-
tional negotiators:
[T]hese insidious chemical weapons are virtually identical in appearance to
ordinary weapons; plants for producing chemicals for weapons are difficult
to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and, in fact,
some chemicals with peaceful utility are structurally similar to some chemi-
cals that are used in warfare. So verification is particularly difficult with
chemical weapons. 10
The Vice President urged the Conference to agree to the American treaty
proposal, which he characterized as containing "an entirely new concept
for overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past
toward a full chemical weapons ban, namely, the obstacle of verifica-
tion."'" In the Vice President's words, this new American proposal
7. The text itself is incomplete, with many items intentionally left blank for the negotiators
to fill in as agreement is reached. See, eg., id., art. III(2)(b). Of particular importance to this
discussion is Annex II of the Draft Convention, which purports to flesh out the verification
provisions. The first sentence of Annex II reads: "Provisions along the following lines should
be included:". Id.
8. Geneva Protocol of 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DIs-
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 14 (5th ed. 1982).
This document provides an excellent brief history of the Protocol's adoption. Id. at 9-13. For
discussions of types of chemical weapons and the history of their international regulation, see
F. BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RESTRAINTS (1968) and A. THOMAS & A.
THOMAS, JR., DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (1968).
9. Chemical Warfare: Arms Control and Proliferation, Joint Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Govern-
ment Processes of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Kenneth L. Adelman, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency). See generally Ember, Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Receiving
Increased Attention, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 14, 1986, at 8, which puts
the number of nations possessing chemical weapons at between 15 and 31. The United States,
the Soviet Union, France, and Iraq are known to possess them; Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel,
Ethiopia, Burma, Thailand, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and Vietnam are reported to possess
them; and Iran and South Korea are reportedly seeking them. Id. at 8-11. Formal negotia-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons began in 1977, and
moved to the Forty Nation Conference on Disarmament in 1980. Statement by the U.S. Rep-
resentative (Fields) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention,
April 26, 1984, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, supra note 6, at 353, 354.
10. Address by Vice President George Bush to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention, April 18, 1984, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, supra
note 6, at 299, 300.
11. Id.
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would "open for international inspection on short notice all ... military
or government-owned or government-controlled facilities" of each
party.12 Acknowledging that "openness entails burdens for every State
. . . including the United States of America," 13 the Vice President as-
serted that on-site inspection is "the sine qua non of an effective chemical
weapons ban."' 14
Verification is a concept that has become inextricably entwined with
arms control. It is a shorthand term for all means by which a party to a
treaty satisfies itself through objective evidence that other parties are, in
fact, complying with treaty commitments. 15 Its origins lie both in skepti-
cism that nations will observe the arms control treaties into which they
12. Id. at 303.
13. The American Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament elaborated on the ex-
tent of this burden in a speech to the Conference. Referring to one of the types of on-site
inspection that the Draft Convention would create, he noted:
My Government recognizes that these special on-site inspection procedures will require
an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all countries that pose a risk to sensi-
tive activities not related to chemical weapons.... [Tihe United States has decided that
the benefits flowing from such an inspection scheme greatly outweigh the risks.... The
United States seriously considers that any risks can be minimized and managed through
appropriate procedures for initiating and conducting special on-site inspections .... I
want to assure all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament that my Government
did not take the decision lightly to include this "open invitation" provision in our draft
convention. There should be no question that the United States is willing to accept the
consequences of these provisions.
Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical
Weapons Convention-Compliance, July -19, 1984 [hereinafter Statement by the U.S. Repre-
sentative], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, supra note 6, at 531, 533.
14. Address by Vice President Bush, supra note 10, at 304. Curiously, a representative of
the Chemical Manufacturers' Association was quoted recently as stating in reference to the
Draft Convention that "industry wouldn't object to on-site inspections and to scrutinization of
records" because the current recordkeeping burden is so great that compliance inspections
would not make it greater, although he noted concern about "safeguards to protect intellectual
property." Ember, supra note 9, at 16. A number of other chemical industry representatives
have expressed concern about the degree to which the Draft Convention protects proprietary
and confidential information. See Marshall, Progress on a Chemical Arms Treaty, 238 ScI-
ENCE 471, 472 (Oct. 23, 1987); Ember, Global Chemical Experts Offer Advise for Chemical
Weapons Treaty, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, July 27, 1987, at 16. See generally
Hearings, supra note 9 (discussing verification problems). The West German view was ex-
pressed more directly. The Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany reacted to the
Draft Convention's verification provisions by stating:
We are ... concerned that the mechanisms envisaged for the verification of nonproduc-
tion, as laid out in the United States draft, should not entail unnecessary burdens for the
civilian chemical industry. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the chemical industry is
an important pillar of our overall economic performance. It is therefore a legitimate con-
sideration to seek to avoid intrusive measures that would not directly raise the level of
effectiveness of verification.
Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (Wegener) to the Con-
ference on Disarmament: Conference Procedures and Chemical Weapons Convention, Apr.
26, 1984, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, supra note 6, at 364, 368.
15. See M. KREPON, supra note 5, at 14-27.
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enter and in fear of the military consequences of undiscovered cheating. 16
On-site inspection has historically been a very controversial means of
verifying arms control treaties.17 Verification of the major nuclear weap-
ons treaties of the past has been accomplished without on-site inspection,
mostly by such "national technical means" as surveillance satellites, re-
mote seismic networks, radars, and electronic intercepts-devices typi-
cally based in the territory of the nation seeking to verify the treaty, or in
orbit, in international waters, or on the soil of other nations. 18
If on-site inspection is the sine qua non of a chemical weapons treaty
today, advances in weapons technology and recent political develop-
ments19 suggest that this may become true for some future nuclear weap-
ons agreements as well. With the increasing accuracy of land-based
strategic weapons, 20 enhancing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
survivability through concealment, deception, active defense, increased
missile mobility, or some combination of these measures has become
more and more essential.21 These improvements in mobility, conceal-
ment, and deception may create imperatives for future nuclear weapons
treaties to include intrusive verification provisions similar to those in the
Draft Convention. Indeed, the Reagan Administration's position on ver-
ification of nuclear weapons treaties explicitly recognizes that this trend
will require methods of verification that go beyond national technical
means.
22
The recently concluded Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union illustrates the Reagan
Administration's view of this problem, as well as the trend toward on-site
inspection as its solution. 23 Among the weapons that are included in this
16. Id. at 14; Adam, supra note 5, at 42, 54.
17. See Adam, supra note 5, at 74; M. KREPON, supra note 5, at 20-27.
18. Adam, supra note 5, at 43.
19. See, e.g., Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and Vow to Work for Greater
Reductions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 6 (treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces
signed in Washington); How to Destroy 2,611 Missiles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
20. The principal technological threat to U.S. strategic forces at the moment is increas-
ing missile accuracy. This has made possible an attack on hard targets (such as missile
silos) at a cost that is easily commensurate with the value of the target. The result has
been decreased ICBM survivability and a perceived increase in strategic instability, as one
side or the other may find a first strike a viable option. The chief U.S. response has been to
harden its land-based missile silos ....
Scowcroft, Technology and Strategic Forces, in SCIENCE AND SECURITY: THE FUTURE OF
ARMS CONTROL 1 (W. Wander, R. Scribner, and K. Luongo eds. 1986).
21. Id.; see also Adam, supra note 5, at 43. The need for a mobile, concealable land-based
missile is offered as the major justification for the proposed development of the "Midgetman"
missile. See Scowcroft, supra note 20, at 1-2.
22. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Arms Control Policy, in
SCIENCE AND SECURITY: THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL, supra note 20, at 87-88.
23. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, supra note 5; see also S. GOLDMAN, P. GALLIS &
J. VOGAS, VERIFYING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: THE SOVIET VIEW 95-96 (Congres-
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agreement are Soviet mobile SS-20's and American Ground-Launched
Cruise Missiles and Pershing II's,24 the concealability of which makes
verification of the level of their deployment difficult. 25 During the period
in the negotiations when the Soviet Union insisted that both sides be al-
lowed to retain the capability to manufacture and deploy a limited
number of missiles, then Defense Secretary Weinberger contended that
on-site inspections of Soviet SS-20 factories would be "an absolute essen-
tial" in order to verify that the limits would be observed.26 Even when
the Soviets agreed to eliminate INF weapons altogether, thereby obviat-
ing the American problem of accurately tracking the number of SS-20's
that would be manufactured, the United States still asserted that on-site
inspections of a less intrusive nature would be required, 27 and they were
included in the treaty.28 In any event, the original American position on
INF verification apparently is indicative of the present American posi-
tion on the verification needs, including on-site inspection, of a Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), as well. 29 Consequently, important
lessons may be learned by reviewing those constitutional issues raised by
the on-site inspection provisions of the Draft Convention that may also
apply to nuclear weapons treaties.30
The importance of these issues has become apparent recently, since the
Soviets have demonstrated an increasing willingness to discuss on-site
arms control inspections under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. 31
On August 6, 1987, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated in an address to
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament that "the Soviet delegation at
the negotiations on [a chemical weapons treaty] will proceed from the
need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge in-
sional Research Service Report No. 87-316F, Apr. 16, 1987), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ARMS
CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1987); Mendelsohn, INF Verification: A Guide
for the Perplexed, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1987, at 25 (brief history of evolution of
American and Soviet positions on verification of an INF treaty).
24. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 11(2), III.
25. S. GOLDMAN, P. GALLIS & J. VOGAS, supra note 23, at 96.
26. Mendelsohn, supra note 23, at 25-26.
27. Id. at 28.
28. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, supra note 5, art. XI.
29. Flournoy, A Rocky START- Optimism and Obstacles on the Road to Reductions,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 7, 13 (Oct. 1987).
30. Vice President Bush asserted: "If the international community.., joins us in subscrib-
ing to [open invitation verification inspections] .... [w]e will have set a bold example for
overcoming barriers that impede effective arms control in other areas." Address by Vice Presi-
dent Bush, supra note 10, at 304.




spections without right of refusal."'32 General Secretary Gorbachev has
proclaimed that "the Soviet Union has no objection to any verification
procedures" 33 in the context of a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons.
Indeed, in July 1986 the Soviets, as part of a pilot program to demon-
strate the verifiability of a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban,34
allowed a private American environmental organization to place three
seismic monitoring stations on Soviet territory in the vicinity of the coun-
try's largest nuclear test site. In September 1987 the Soviets invited a
delegation of Western observers, including three members of the U.S.
Congress, to tour and photograph a giant radar under construction near
Krasnoyarsk that the Reagan Administration has asserted violates the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 35 One month later, the Soviets invited rep-
resentatives of 45 nations, including the United States, to visit a chemical
weapons production facility at Shikany and view an assortment of
nineteen types of chemical weapons.36
This movement by the Soviets away from their historical opposition to
on-site inspection is part of what one U.S. diplomat claims is a long-term
maturing of Soviet attitudes toward negotiating in general. 37 If Ameri-
can constitutional law permits only relatively unintrusive on-site verifica-
tion inspections, then perhaps an area of United States/Soviet agreement
on the scope of on-site inspection can more easily be reached. This
32. Address by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Geneva Conference on Disarmament
(August 6, 1987), reprinted in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mission to the United Na-
tions, Press Release No. 103, at 11 (Aug. 7, 1987); see also Soviet Says Pershing Missiles Are
Main Impediment to Pact, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
On August 11, 1987, the Soviet Representative to the Conference on Disarmament elabo-
rated on this position, emphasizing:
In our view the procedure of challenge inspections must securely ensure that no fact of
violating the Convention and the consequences of such violation can be concealed by a
state.... The fact that we have adopted the principle of mandatory challenge inspections
does not however mean that we can disregard a possible disclosure of sensitive data,
which can happen during such inspections, especially in case of abuse.
Statement by Youri K. Nazarkin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, U.S.S.R.
Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (Aug. 11, 1987), at 2. (Copy on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law). The speech discusses at great length various means of
proscribing challenge inspections in order to protect such "sensitive data." See id.
33. Adam, supra note 5, at 42-43.
34. U.S. Group Checks Soviet Atomic Site, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at Al, col. 5; Wes-
terners Reach Soviet to Check Atom Site, N. Y. Times, July 6, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
35. Inside a Key Russian Radar Site: Tour Raises Questions on Treaty, N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1987, at Al, col. I.
36. Soviets Allow Experts to Tour Chemical Weapons Facilities, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987,
at A17, col. 4.
37. Adam, supra note 5, at 70, 74 (quoting Warren Heckrotte, U.S. technical advisor on
nuclear test ban talks from 1961 through the late 1970s).
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would not be the first time a confluence of interest had its source in con-
tradictory values. 38
The remainder of this article consists of four sections. The first section
describes the on-site inspection provisions of the Draft Convention. The
second section analyzes the Fourth Amendment issues raised by these
provisions. The third section explores remote monitoring methods of
arms control verification that may minimize Fourth Amendment
problems, the feasibility of using the Spending Power to induce consent
to on-site inspections by federal contractors, and a possible statutory so-
lution. The last section presents the conclusions that this review
suggests.
I. On-Site Inspection in the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention
The Reagan Administration has described the Draft Convention as a
comprehensive ban on "the possession, production, acquisition, retention
or transfer of chemical weapons."' 39 If the Draft Convention were
adopted, the posession of chemical weapons, 40 as well as the facilities
that manufacture their raw materials, 41 would be strictly limited.42 All
parties would be required to declare and destroy existing chemical weap-
ons stockpiles43 and production facilities.44
38. Jack Sprat Could eat no Fat,
His Wife could eat no Lean;
And so, betwixt them both,
They lick'd the platter clean.
W. BARING-GOULD & C. BARING-GOULD, THE ANNOTATED MOTHER GoosE 63 (1962).
39. Address by Vice President Bush, supra note 10, at 300.
40. The Draft Convention defines the term "chemical weapons" to include, inter alia,
super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except
for those chemicals intended solely for permitted purposes... and except for those chemi-
cals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal, chemicals and which are used by a
Party for domestic law-enforcement and riot control purposes or used as a herbicide....
Draft Convention, supra note 6, at art. II(1)(a). Each of the terms "super-toxic lethal chemi-
cal," "other lethal chemical," "other harmful chemical," and "toxic chemical" are defined in
technical language relating to their potential for harming humans. Id., art. II(2)-(5). "Precur-
sors" are chemicals that can be "used in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other
lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical." Id., art. 11 (6).
41. The term "chemical weapons production facility" includes buildings and equipment
designed, constructed, or used since January 1, 1946, for producing any toxic chemical for
chemical weapons or certain precursors, or for filling chemical weapons. Id., art. 11(10).
42. Article III of the Draft Convention specifies the activities that would be permitted.
For example, each party would be allowed to possess no more than one metric ton of super-
toxic lethal chemicals or certain precursors, id., art. III(2)(a), and any production of these
could only take place at a single facility with a limited manufacturing capacity, Id., art.
III(2)(b).
43. Id., art. V(1)(e).
44. Id., art. VI(1)(g).
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A. The Enforcement Framework
The Draft Convention contemplates the creation of a specialized bu-
reaucracy to enforce its provisions. A "Consultative Committee," made
up of one representative from each party, would be established with the
responsibility to "oversee the implementation of the Convention, pro-
mote the verification of compliance with the Convention, and carry out
international consultations and cooperation among Parties to the Con-
vention."'45 The Consultative Committee would delegate to an "Execu-
tive Council" the authority to make most day-to-day decisions.46 The
Executive Council would be made up of representatives of the Parties
elected to two-year terms by the Consultative Committee, plus represent-
atives of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) who become Parties to the treaty.47
Compliance with the Draft Convention would be reviewed by two
subordinate bodies of the Consultative Committee: the "Fact-Finding
Panel ' 48 and the "Technical Secretariat. ' 49 The Fact-Finding Panel
would consist of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and three others elected by the Consultative Committee.50 The Panel's
major responsibility would be to respond to requests by a party for infor-
mation, which would require reviewing available information, con-
ducting necessary inquiries, and making "appropriate findings of fact," 51
including "considering reports on special on-site inspections .. .and
overseeing ad hoc inspections .... -52
The Technical Secretariat would consist of an administrative staff, in-
cluding "technically qualified" inspectors,5 3 that would carry out on-site
inspections for the Fact-Finding Panel and provide other technical and
administrative assistance. 54
The Draft Convention would allow on-site inspections of various facil-
ities located within the jurisdictions of signatories. Three types of on-site
inspection would be permitted: systematic international on-site verifica-
tion inspections, special on-site inspections, and ad hoc on-site inspec-
45. Id., art. VII(2).
46. Id., art. VII(3).
47. Id., annex I, § B(2)(a)-(c).
48. Id., annex I, § C(1).
49. Id., annex I, § D.
50. Id., annex I, § C(2).
51. Id., annex I, § C(3)(a).
52. Id., annex I, § C(1).
53. Id., annex I, § D(3).
54. Id., annex I, § D(1).
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tions. 5 The remainder of this section will describe briefly each of these
types of inspection.
B. Systematic International On-Site Verification Inspections
Since the Draft Convention contemplates the destruction of most ex-
isting stocks of chemical weapons and the dismantling of the facilities
that produce them,56 it would require that so-called systematic interna-
tional on-site verification inspections be permitted at predetermined
stages of this process. Thus, inspections of each party's declared chemi-
cal weapons inventory57 and storage facilities 8 would take place
before, 59 during,60 and after61 closure and destruction. In addition, the
Draft Convention prescribes systematic international on-site inspections
where activities occur that the treaty specifically would allow, such as the
maintenance of certain limited chemical weapons62 and permitted chemi-
cal weapons precursors.63
Although the Draft Convention does not specify in great detail the
procedures for systematic international on-site inspections, it does give
some parameters. Both persons and instruments would be allowed as
part of the inspection procedure. 64 Inspections could include sampling of
materials, as well as examination of records.6 5 The Draft Convention
envisions random inspections 66 and inspections triggered by particular
events.6
7
C. Special On-Site Inspections
Unlike systematic international on-site verification inspections, special
on-site inspections pursuant to Article X of the Draft Convention osten-
55. But see Note, supra note 1, at 1063, which states that the Draft Convention generally
utilizes only two forms of on-site inspection: special on-site inspections and ad hoc on-site
inspections. However, this omits systematic international on-site verification inspections,
which have an independent basis in the Draft Convention. Compare Draft Convention, supra
note 6, art. VII(2)(a) with id., art. VII(2)(c).
56. See Draft Convention, supra note 6, arts. III-VI.
57. Id., art. V(l)(c).
58. Id., art. V(2).
59. Id., art. VI(1)(e).
60. Id., art. V(l)(f).
61. Id.
62. Id., art. III(2)(b).
63. Id., art. III(3)(b).
64. Id., annex II, § B(A)(2).
65. Id., annex II, § B(G)(3).
66. Id., annex II, § B(F)(2) (providing for periodic inspections of the single facility each
Party is permitted to use for producing super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors).
67. Id., annex II, §§ B(B)(1),(3) (specifying the inspections to be performed before and
after the destruction of chemical weapons stocks).
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sibly require justification by the party who requests them. The request-
ing party is only entitled to an inspection of the facilities of another party
in order to "clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts
about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which
may be considered ambiguous .... ,s68 Thus, some level of suspicion re-
garding compliance with the Draft Convention appears to be contem-
plated as a prerequisite to a special on-site inspection. However, the
approval of only a single member of the Fact-Finding Panel69 is neces-
sary to trigger such an inspection. Since that Panel includes both the
United States and the Soviet Union,70 an objective review process for
these requests cannot realistically be intended. In effect, special on-site
inspections are to be available on demand.
Once a special on-site inspection has been initiated, the party being
inspected must "provide the inspection team unimpeded access to the
location or facility" within 24 hours of notification.71 The inspection
team is to consist of one person from each member State of the Fact-
Finding Panel, except the State that is the subject of the inspection. 72
The results of the inspection are to be presented in a written report. 73
Special on-site inspections would be considerably more intrusive than
systematic international on-site verification inspections. Any party to the
treaty would be empowered to request a special on-site inspection of any
military or other "location or facility" owned by any other party.74 In
addition, the Draft Convention would open for special on-site inspec-
tions, "as set forth in Annex II, locations or facilities controlled by the
Government of a Party. ' 75 Annex II, in turn, is vague regarding which
installations are "controlled by the Government of a Party," stating only
that the treaty in its final form should include
the relevant facilities used for the provision of goods and services to the
Government of a Party. It is intended that this provision reach any location
or facility that in the future might be suspected of being used for activities
in violation of this Convention. The specification of such locations and fa-
cilities should be a reasonable one.7 6
68. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art X(l).
69. The power of a member of the Fact-Finding Panel to request a special on-site inspec-
tion is termed a "right." Id.
70. Id., annex I, § C(2)(e).
71. Id., art. X(2)(b).
72. Id., art. X(4).
73. Id.
74. Id., art. X(1)(a)-(b). It appears that the Draft Convention also would allow special on-
site inspections at facilities where systematic international on-site verification inspections had
already taken place.
75. Id., art. X(l)(b).
76. Id., annex II, § B(H)(2).
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It is therefore not clear from the text of the Draft Convention whether or
to what extent private firms in the United States would be subject to
special on-site inspections. 77
The political and legal importance of this ambiguity cannot be overes-
timated. At the time the United States proposed the Draft Convention in
Geneva, the Soviet Union immediately protested that the document "is
built on a blatantly discriminatory basis, and places States with different
social systems in unequal situations" 78 because it would treat capitalist
nations differently from socialist countries. The Soviet Ambassador to
the Geneva Convention took the position that the proposed treaty lan-
guage would not subject the private firms of capitalist nations to on-site
inspections.7 9 This prompted the United States Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament to respond:
The statement has been made that, since the [special on-site inspection] pro-
vision applies to government-owned or government-controlled facilities, it
discriminates against some economic and political systems. The argument
seems to be that, since the civilian chemical industries in some socialist
countries are owned by the government, these facilities would be subject to
article X, whereas the chemical industries in the United States or other
western countries, since they are privately owned, would not be covered by
article X.... Article X covers not only those locations and facilities that
are owned by the government, but also those controlled by the government,
whether through contract, other obligations, or regulatory requirements.
The privately-owned chemical industries of the United States are so heavily
regulated by the United States Government that this equates to the term
controlled as used in the draft convention. Thus, the private chemical in-
dustry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of
article X.80
Because the Soviet reaction strongly suggests that it will not enter into a
chemical weapons treaty involving on-site verification inspections unless
privately-owned firms in the West are subject to inspection to the same
extent as government-owned firms in the Eastern bloc, and because the
Reagan Administration has made on-site inspections a condition of
77. However, the policy of including facilities that "might be suspected" of treaty viola-
tions certainly suggests that a broad range of installations would be subject to special on-site
inspections. This is reinforced by the procedure for ordering such inspections, which permits a
single party to request one and provides for no impartial review. Id., art. X(I).
78. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan), to the Conference on Disarma-
ment: Chemical Weapons [Extract], Apr. 26, 1984, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMA-
MENT, supra note 6, at 359, 361.
79. Pincus, U.S. Clarifies Stand on Chemical Pact: Soviets Offered Private Plant Inspec-
tion, Wash. Post, May 1, 1984, at A12, col. 5.




American approval,81 it will be assumed for the remainder of this analy-
sis that all U.S. chemical companies-regardless of whether they actually
produce weapons-and all privately-owned firms holding government
contracts, are included in "locations or facilities controlled by the Gov-
ernment of a Party" and would be subject to special on-site inspections.8 2
In addition to questions regarding state and private ownership or con-
trol, problems of extraterritoriality also arise. It is unclear whether over-
seas subsidiaries of American chemical companies or government
contractors would be included among those "controlled by the Govern-
ment" within the meaning of the Draft Convention, and, hence, subject
to special on-site inspections. The terms of the Draft Convention itself
purport to be very far-reaching, not only prohibiting activities under-
taken by a party in direct contravention of its terms, but also making it a
violation to "assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone
to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention. ' 83
The underlying policy of the Draft Convention clearly is to obligate a
party to abide by its terms in the broadest possible circumstances, but the
terms of the proposal itself do not state whether it would apply beyond
the territory of a party.
Nor can the question of whether the Draft Convention would apply
extraterritorially to the foreign subsidiaries of American firms be defini-
tively answered using principles of international law, due to the unsettled
state of the law in this area. Under the so-called "territorial principle"
the United States would appear not to have jurisdiction over any firm
located outside of its territory.84 The "nationality principle," however,
creates the possibility that the United States-could permit special on-site
inspections of foreign subsidiaries of American chemical firms or govern-
ment contractors, presuming there is no conflict with the law of the na-
tion in which the firm is located. The nationality principle rationalizes
the assertion of jurisdiction by a nation over its nationals, even when they
81. Dickson, Chemical Weapons Pact Edging Closer, 235 SCIENCE 1452, 1453 (1987).
82. See Statement by the U.S. Representative, supra note 13, at 534, in which the Ameri-
can position on the Draft Convention is stated: "No imbalance in inspection obligations is
either desired, intended, or contained. .. "
83. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art I(d).
84. Marcuss and Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The
Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 439, 441 (1981). This analysis is rein-
forced by Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: "Unless a
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon
each party in respect of its entire territory." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan.
27, 1980, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 875, 884 (1969). However, this Convention has not been ratified by the United States. See
T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 242
(1987). The Convention has not been signed by the Soviet Union. M. BOWMAN & D. HAR-
RIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 326 (1984).
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are located in other states. 85 Indeed, a major use of the nationality prin-
ciple is to regulate the conduct of foreign subsidiaries of American corpo-
rations, through such means as the antiboycott provisions of the Export
Administration Act of 1979.86 An answer to the question of extraterrito-
riality in this field will have to await resolution of the issues surrounding
the external reach of the U.S. Constitution, and the relationship of parent
corporations to subsidiary corporations in transnational law, and is thus
beyond the scope of this article.
D. Ad Hoc On-Site Inspections
Ad hoe on-site inspections are similar to special on-site inspections,
but apply to different kinds of locations and facilities. The justification
required for an ad hoe on-site inspection is identical to that for a special
on-site inspection, 87 but approval must be obtained from the Fact-Find-
ing Panel, either by consensus or vote, before the inspection may take
place.8 8 Moreover, the party to be inspected may refuse access, albeit
only "for the most exceptional reasons," 89 and then only accompanied by
"a full explanation of the reasons for the refusal and a detailed, concrete
proposal for an alternative means of resolving the concerns which gave
rise to the request." 90 Other features of ad hoc on-site inspections, such
as the composition of the inspection team, are not specified.
Ad hoc on-site inspections apply to "any location or facility not sub-
ject to" systematic international on-site verification inspections or special
6n-site inspections. 91 Thus, "locations or facilities" unrelated to chemi-
cal weapons production and unregulated by the government would be
open to ad hoe on-site inspections. Even if the Soviet assertion that spe-
cial on-site inspections would be visited only on government-owned
85. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 84, at 443. A corollary to the question of whether the
United States could consent to on-site arms control inspections of a foreign subsidiary of an
American firm is whether such a foreign subsidiary would be entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection. While the Fourth Amendment certainly would protect an American citizen
abroad from unreasonable searches by agents of the U.S. government under color of federal
law, it is unclear whether this would extend to subsidiaries that are foreign citizens. Note, The
Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649,
659-71 (1986).
86. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 84, at 444, 448-52. Generally, the antiboycott statute
precludes persons subject to its jurisdiction from refusing to do business with anyone
pursuant to an agreement with, requirement of or on request or behalf of a boycotting
country. It also outlaws boycott-based refusals by such persons to employ any United
States person because of race, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. at 449.
87. Compare Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. X(l) with id., art. XI(l).
88. Id., art. XI(2)(b), Annex I, A(5).
89. Id., art. XI(2)(b).
90. Id., art. XI(2)(c).
91. Id., art. XI(l).
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firms92 is correct, privately owned firms would be subject to ad hoc
inspections.93
Guidelines have been proposed that would limit the reach of ad hoc
on-site inspections. 94 The criteria for determining whether to grant a re-
quest for an inspection would include whether it would "assist in deter-
mining the facts," 95 whether the locations to be inspected are carefully
limited only to those relevant to the investigation,96 and whether the pro-
posed inspection would "limit intrusion to the level necessary to deter-
mine the facts."' 97 The omission of such restrictions from the
descriptions of the other two types of inspections suggests the breadth of
the investigations pursuant to systematic and special inspections that is
contemplated by the Draft Convention.
The Draft Convention embodies a very clear and emphatic set of poli-
cies requiring intrusive on-site verification inspections of any party.
While the proposal was intended to be a preliminary draft subject to fu-
ture negotiations, the Reagan Administration regards these policies as
essential components of any future chemical weapons pact. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume the Draft Convention will become effective as
proposed for purposes of an analysis of its constitutional implications in
the United States.
II. The Fourth Amendment and On-Site Inspections Under
the Draft Convention
The Draft Convention raises important constitutional questions be-
cause it would delegate on-site inspection responsibility-an investigative
law enforcement function-to an international organization. Because the
resolution by American courts of conflicts between treaties and the Bill
of Rights has a sparse and checkered history,98 it is impossible to predict
with certainty how these problems would be viewed by the judiciary. In
an attempt to raise and define the issues, this section will analyze the U.S.
court decisions that appear to provide the most relevant precedents.
Should an inconsistency between the Draft Convention and the Con-
stitution be argued before a court, the terms of the Draft Convention
make clear that the Constitution controls. Article XII obligates each
party, inter alia, to "take any measures necessary in accordance with its
92. See supra text accompanying note 79.
93. Read broadly, private homes might be included as well.
94. Draft Convention, supra note 6, annex II, § B(H)(3).
95. Id., annex II, § B(H)(3)(b).
96. Id., annex II, § B(H)(3)(c).
97. Id., annex II, § B(H)(3)(d).
98. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 251-70 (1972).
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constitutional processes to implement this Convention . . -99 The real
question is whether aspects of the Draft Convention are so inconsistent
with the Constitution that this provision would have to be invoked-at
potentially enormous political and jurisprudential cost.
A. Fourth Amendment Requirements
The key constitutional question raised by the Draft Convention is
whether the Fourth Amendment forbids the on-site inspections that it
contemplates. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 1°°
If on-site inspections under the Draft Convention violate the Fourth
Amendment, those subject to inspection might be able to obtain relief
from a federal court to prevent such an inspection from taking place.
The formulation usually cited by the Supreme Court in its contempo-
rary Fourth Amendment decisions10 1 is Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States.10 2 Justice Harlan stated: "There is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "103 Where these re-
quirements are met, the protections of the Fourth Amendment are
triggered. 104
The protections provided by the Fourth Amendment apply to busi-
nesses as well as to individuals in their homes. In California v.
Ciraolo,10 5 the Supreme Court affirmed that the inside of a home is the
place "where privacy expectations are most heightened."' 1 6 The Court
has held it to be a "'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."' 1 7 The Court has also interpreted the Fourth Amend-
99. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. XII (emphasis added); cf Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. I, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the
Constitution over a treaty.") (footnote omitted).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986).
102. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 361.
104. Id.
105. 106 S. Ct. 1809.
106. Id. at 1812.
107. Payton v. Nev York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1979) (citation omitted).
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ment to mean that "[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence,
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable
official entries upon his private commercial property. ' 10 8 Thus, inspec-
tions of commercial property pursuant to the Draft Convention must
meet the standards that the Supreme Court has developed to determine
the reasonableness of such official entries.
The Supreme Court has adopted the general rule that a valid search
warrant is a necessary prerequisite to a constitutionally valid search. 10 9
The justification for this rule is that search warrants may only be issued
by a magistrate, who interposes a neutral review process between the
government agency seeking the inspection and its subject.110 Central to
this review process is the requirement that the government prove to the
magistrate that "probable cause" exists."1
The primary Fourth Amendment problem created by the Draft Con-
vention is that it does not provide explicitly for the procurement of
search warrants prior to on-site inspections. The language of the Draft
Convention is explicit regarding procedures for initiating an inspection,
and offers no opportunity for the U.S. Government to obtain a search
warrant from an American magistrate before the representatives of the
Consultative Committee 12 would be entitled to carry out an inspec-
tion.11 3 Perhaps the unstated policy behind this is the Reagan Adminis-
tration's insistence that on-site inspections take place on "short
notice"1 14 and without interference by the party to be inspected. On-site
108. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
109. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See generally Bacigal, The
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 249 (1975).
110. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33.
111. "'[P]robable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." Id. at 534.
112. The fact that these inspectors might be foreign citizens employed by an international
organization probably would not relieve them of whatever responsibilities the Fourth Amend-
ment otherwise would impose directly on federal employees, because their actions would occur
under color of federal law with the active cooperation of the federal government. See Annota-
tion, Application of Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Evidence Obtained through
Search Conducted by Officials of Foreign Government, 33 A.L.R. FED. 342, 347-49 (1977).
113. Nor do the annexes to the Draft Convention imply that on-site inspections in the
United States ordinarily would be preceded by a warrant. While mention is made in several
places of restrictions on the time, place, and manner of inspections that should be the subject
of future negotiations, see, e.g., Draft Convention, supra note 6, annex II, § B(H), the only
provision that could reasonably be construed to allow for a warrant is Article XI(2)(c), which
would allow a Party to refuse an ad hoe on-site inspection. In theory, the United States could
seek a warrant for any location or facility sought to be inspected under Article XI, obtain a
magistrate's decision within the requisite 24 hours of such a request by the Fact-Finding Panel,
id., and refuse the inspection if the decision is unfavorable. However, this assumes congruence
between the level of suspicion sufficient to trigger an ad hoc on-site inspection and the level of
probable cause necessary to support a warrant.
114. The Vice President underscored the extraordinary nature of the on-site inspection
provisions in stating:
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inspections thus would have to qualify for an exemption from the Fourth
Amendment's search warrant requirement.
The remainder of this section discusses how the on-site inspection pro-
visions of the Draft Convention would stand up to a challenge alleging
that a warrantless inspection pursuant to the Convention violates the
Fourth Amendment. First, the outline of a hypothetical lawsuit to en-
join an on-site arms control inspection is considered, including whether a
plaintiff could satisfy the demands of standing and justiciability. Second,
I address the question whether on-site inspections pursuant to arms con-
trol treaties are generally exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement because they involve foreign affairs. Third, assuming that
the Fourth Amendment does require a warrant prior to an on-site inspec-
tion under an arms control treaty, I examine the principles underlying
the exemptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that are
most likely to be asserted to justify the particular on-site inspections in
the Draft Convention. Finally, I analyze each of the three types of on-
site inspection contained in the Draft Convention using these principles
to determine how a court might decide such a challenge.
B. Posture of a Hypothetical Suit to Enjoin an On-Site
Arms Control Inspection
In our hypothetical lawsuit, a private chemical manufacturer seeks an
injunction to prevent an on-site inspection. The broad proposition that
private plaintiffs could challenge the reasonableness of on-site arms con-
trol inspections in federal court 1 5 finds some support in Supreme Court
precedent. If the courts would hear such suits, then plaintiffs who could
prove that an on-site arms control inspection violated their Fourth
Amendment rights could obtain either damages' 16 or an injunction. 117
This pledge to an "open invitation" for inspections is not made lightly. We make it be-
cause it is indispensable to an effective chemical weapons ban. The essence of verification
is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection. The "open invitation" procedures
will increase the chances that violations will be detected and the chances that, in the event
of violations, the evidence necessary for an appropriate international response can be col-
lected. That is the heart of deterring violations.
Address by Vice President Bush, supra note 10, at 303.
115. State courts probably would lack jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief in such a case
because it would involve restraining the actions of officials, albeit foreigners, acting under color
of federal law. See Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower
Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 88-92 (1975).
116. The Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), announced that damages are available to plaintiffs to compen-
sate for violations of Fourth Amendment rights by agents of the federal government. The
Court held, however, that damages would be available only to the extent that the individual
plaintiff was hurt. The fact that constitutional rights, rather than mere common law or statu-
tory rights, might be at the root of the action would thus not add to the compensation. Roth-
Vol. 13:21, 198 8
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Before a federal court would reach the remedy issue, however, the plain-
tiff would have to clear preliminary hurdles posed by the doctrines of
standing and justiciability.I1 8
The Court recently summarized, in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State,119 its precedents
on standing as requiring, "at an irreducible minimum," a plaintiff "to
'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' . . . and that
the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision.' "120 A chemical manufacturer
about to be inspected could allege that trade secrets or other confidential
competitive information or processes to which the public is not permitted
access might be compromised by the admission of foreign inspectors, and
that this injury could only be prevented by enjoining the inspection.
berg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs-A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and
Process, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77, 86-87 (1986) (discussing Memphis Community School
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)). However, a suit for damages under Bivens can be
unsuccessful because of the immunity of various federal officials to such actions. See Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on official acts) with Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (presidential aides entitled only to qualified or good faith
immunity).
117. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Court upheld the grant of an
injunction against an attempted search that it found to contravene the Fourth Amendment.
Injunctions have historically been a more likely remedy than damages in constitutional litiga-
tion. Rotenberg, supra note 116, at 85. A plaintiff's allegation that there is no adequate rem-
edy at law for injuries inflicted by an unconstitutional search would be bolstered by the
decision in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which held that an in-
junction would lie against federal government disclosure of certain trade secrets. Id. at 970.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), the Court stated that "the right
to be free of appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law." Id. at 1823.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has limited the injunction remedy by requiring plaintiffs
to prove "great and immediate" harm in addition to the traditional requirement of demon-
strating irreparable injury. City of Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983); see also
Rotenberg, supra note 116, at 85. It seems unlikely, however, that the notion of "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress" noted in Bivens,
403 U.S. at 396, would be an obstacle to an injunction under current law because such a suit
would not involve the creation of a new remedy; it would merely involve the application of a
long-recognized remedy to a new fact situation. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Court
would extend such an exception to obviate a suit like this one. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983) (judicial relief denied for violation of federal employee's First Amendment rights where
Congress has provided administrative forum).
118. See generally Note, Congressional Nuclear Freeze Proposals: Constitutionality and
Enforcement, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 483, 486-519 (1986). While it is unclear whether this
hypothetical lawsuit would be ripe prior to the announcement that the plaintiff chemical man-
ufacturer was to be the subject of an on-site inspection, cf Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 80-81
(1971), it is evident that once the decision to search its premises has been made, the dispute
would be ripe for resolution. Cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307.
119. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
120. Id. at 472 (citations and footnote omitted).
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Such a claim would appear to meet the standing test set out in Valley
Forge.121
The question of whether such a lawsuit would be justiciable is more
difficult. The standard most often cited for determining what constitutes
a non-justiciable political question is contained in Baker v. Carr :122
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.' 23
Several of the considerations noted in Baker suggest that our hypotheti-
cal case could involve a nonjusticiable political question. Foreign affairs
has traditionally been considered an area in which Executive Branch
power is preeminent, in part because of the importance of the U.S. gov-
ernment speaking with a single voice in international matters. 124 It could
be argued that merely hearing a claim to prevent the domestic enforce-
ment of what the United States regards as an essential element of an arms
control treaty could create "embarrassment"' 125 for the President. Fur-
thermore, the inspection provisions of a chemical weapons treaty would
presumably have been debated in the Senate prior to ratification. A
"political decision" that such inspections were in the national interest
would thus "already [have been] made" 126 by the two branches charged
121. For example, it might be claimed that disclosure of trade secrets arising out of an
inspection of the plaintiff chemical manufacturer would harm its competitive position, either in
the domestic or the world market. Cf Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
122. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
123. Id. at 217.
124. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003-04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936)). See generally Note,
Whether the President May Terminate A Mutual Defense Treaty Without Congressional Ap-
proval Under the Constitution is a Non-Justiciable Political Question, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 659
(1979-80). In Dow, however, the Court refused to approve a lower court injunction against
aerial photography by an agency of the federal government that might record trade secrets,
apparently because the Court was not convinced that the government would reveal them to
competitors. 106 S. Ct. at 1823. The Court noted: "If the Government were to use the photo-
graphs to compete with Dow, Dow might have a Fifth Amendment 'taking' claim." Id.
125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
126. Id.
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with making and conducting foreign policy.127 Such a decision, on the
sensitive issue of arms control, might be thought to engender an "unu-
sual need" for Judicial Branch deference. 128
Other factors, however, suggest that our hypothetical case might be
justiciable. The presence of a foreign affairs component in a lawsuit does
not in itself require a court to invoke the political question doctrine in the
face of a constitutional claim. 129 Such a case would allege a violation of
private rights that could not be remedied under present law outside the
judiciary. This was exactly the factor noted by the plurality in Goldwater
v. Carter as distinguishing it from the kind of "dispute between coequal
branches of government" that the four justices considered in that case to
be non-justiciable. 130 Thus, the outcome of a motion to dismiss because
of non-justiciability would be uncertain. It will be assumed for the re-
mainder of this article that such a motion would be rejected. It would be
unwise to ignore the Fourth Amendment issues inherent in the Draft
Convention based on such an unpredictable doctrine.
C. Foreign Affairs Exemption to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Requirement
It is possible that searches under treaties generally are exempt from
Fourth Amendment challenges to the absence of a warrant. Some early
legal theories, and even language in early Supreme Court decisions, sug-
gest that the Bill of Rights itself does not apply to treaties.13 1 Thus,
before undertaking any analysis of how the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement applies to specific types of on-site arms control inspections
127. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1951) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (when the President acts pursuant to express congressional authorization,
"his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate").
128. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 542 (1966).
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211 ("[lIt is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."). For a critique of the
Court's use of the political question doctrine in international law, see Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1071 (1985): "In general, judicial review should be available for challenges to executive or
congressional actions that violate fundamental international law norms .... The attempts to
justify a blanket rule of judicial abstention on international law challenges to foreign policy are
ill-conceived.... ." Id. at 1166-67. Lobel considers "fundamental international norms" to be
"the right to life, the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, the freedom
from slavery, or the proscription on ex post facto laws." Id. at 1146. Lobel does not include
the right to be free from unreasonable searches in this list.
130. 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
131. D. ARONowITz, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 18-19 (1965).
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under the Draft Convention, it is necessary to consider whether it would
apply to arms control treaties at all.
The Supreme Court has explicitly avoided ruling on whether a "for-
eign affairs exemption" exists to the search warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. 132 Some lower courts, however, have analyzed this
question in the context of searches of individuals. This subsection con-
siders whether on-site inspections meet the tests these courts have used
for exempting searches from the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment because they involve foreign affairs.
In United States v. TruongDinh Hung,133 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit faced the question of whether extensive warrantless bug-
ging and wiretapping by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
violated the Fourth Amendment. 134 Truong Dinh Hung was suspected
of transmitting classified documents to North Vietnamese diplomats dur-
ing the Vietnam War. The court concluded that some, but not all, of the
eavesdropping was constitutionally valid: "because of the need of the
executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitu-
tional competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a
warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance."' 135 In
trying to limit the situations where warrantless foreign intelligence
searches are constitutionally justified-compromising individual privacy
only where absolutely necessary-the court decided that "[t]he [foreign
intelligence] exception applies only to [surveillance of] foreign powers,
their agents, and their collaborators. Moreover, even these actors receive
the protection of the warrant requirement if the government is primarily
attempting to put together a criminal prosecution."' 36 Thus, the court in
Truong recognized a limited foreign affairs exemption focused on
preventing or punishing espionage.
132. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich. ex rel.
Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972); Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("[lit is plain that the Supreme Court in Keith left unanswered the question whether a foreign
agent exception to the warrant requirement exists."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358
n.23 (1967) ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not
presented by this case.").
133. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
134. Id. at 911-12. In Chagnon, the court considered the appeal of a civil suit for damages
against the Attorney General of the United States arising out of the same facts as Truong, but
filed by plaintiffs whose conversations with Truong had been overheard in the course of the
wiretaps. 642 F.2d at 1252-53, 1255. The court held that "the acts of the Attorney General
were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity," id. at 1266, and affirmed the judgment
of the lower court granting the defendant summary judgment. Id. at 1251.
135. 629 F.2d at 914 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 916.
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In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 137 the District of Columbia Circuit considered
whether damages were owed to American citizens because their tele-
phones had been extensively wiretapped without a warrant by the FBI.
The purpose of the surveillance was to obtain advance knowledge of both
peaceful demonstrations and violent attacks aimed at Soviet offices in
New York City.138 In a lengthy plurality opinion, the court rejected the
arguments advanced by the Attorney General for a foreign affairs exemp-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 139 Although ac-
knowledging that its decision turned on the basic question of "whether a
warrant requirement will better protect Fourth Amendment rights when
foreign intelligence gathering is involved, and whether such a require-
ment would unduly fetter the legitimate functioning of the Govern-
ment,"'140 the court decided that the government's arguments "do not
suggest that the warrant procedure would actually fetter the legitimate
intelligence gathering functions of the Executive Branch."14' In rejecting
the warrant exemption in this case, the court stressed that the Americans
whose telephones were tapped were not connected with the foreign gov-
ernment. The plurality opinion emphasized that "[i]t would indeed be
anomalous to allow the Government to engage in warrantless surrepti-
tious surveillance of activity, which would otherwise remain private and
protected, merely because another government is antagonized by such
activity." 142
Because on-site inspections under an arms control treaty would share
elements crucial to the reasoning in both Truong and Zweibon, it is diffi-
cult to predict whether a court would hold such searches exempt from
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. It could be argued
that, like the foreign intelligence surveillance at issue in Truong, on-site
inspections can only be controlled as a practical matter by the Executive
137. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane) (Zweibon I), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); cf Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Zweibon IV), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 880 (1984); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Zweibon III), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); In Re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(Zweibon II). All of the subsequent opinions involved tangential issues.
138. Zweibon I, 516 F.2d at 605, 608-10.
139. Id. at 669-70. Six of the eight judges who heard this case agreed with this holding. In
Chagnon, 642 F.2d at 1248, the District of Columbia Circuit characterized its earlier holding
in Zweibon I as restricting
the potential reach of the foreign agent exception by explicitly eliminating from its pur-
view surveillance aimed at individuals or domestic organizations not acting on behalf of a
foreign power. The Zweibon I court never squarely ruled that the putative foreign agent
exception to the warrant requirement does not exist.
Id. at 1259 (footnote omitted).
140. Zweibon I, 516 F.2d at 633.
141. Id. at 651.
142. Id. at 653.
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Branch because of their international sensitivity. Indeed, it may well be
that a treaty incorporating on-site inspections would be breached in the
view of other signatories if a proposed inspection in the United States
required pre-inspection review in an American court to determine
whether a warrant would issue. Since termination of such a treaty under
these hypothetical circumstances would close the door to reciprocal in-
spections by the United States of the other signatories, even a court fol-
lowing Zweibon might have to recognize that this would fetter the ability
of the Executive Branch to gather intelligence about the activities of
those foreign governments.143
On the other hand, the court in Truong only contemplated a foreign
affairs exemption that embraced people suspected of conspiring with for-
eign governments. On-site inspections pursuant to arms control treaties
are premised on the concern that the subjects of those inspections might
be acting secretly in concert with their own governments, and against the
interests of the foreign government seeking an inspection-the opposite
of what is normally considered to be espionage. Those few cases that
discuss a possible foreign affairs exemption to the Fourth Amendment
are thus easily distinguished on their facts from our hypothetical. There-
fore, it cannot be assumed that a court would refuse to enjoin a warrant-
less on-site arms control inspection because it involves foreign affairs.
D. "Pervasively Regulated Industries" Exemption to the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement
Assuming that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does ap-
ply generally to on-site inspection by foreigners pursuant to an arms con-
trol treaty, it is possible that an independent exemption might exist based
on the nature of the subjects of the inspection. 144 Perhaps because the
143. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (no warrant requirement for
school officials searching schoolchildren "when 'the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.' ") (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33). In O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987), the Court added
that each "particular class of searches" implies its own standard of reasonableness. Id. at
1499.
144. The Supreme Court has discussed two other possible exemptions. In Camara, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), the Court recognized an "emergency situations" exemption, such as the need
to seize unwholesome food, vaccinate against smallpox, or implement a health quarantine. Id
at 539 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the Court held
that a burning building created "an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless
entry [by firefighters] 'reasonable.' "Id. at 509. Since the possible violation of a treaty would
not appear in itself to threaten public safety in such a direct manner, it does not seem likely
that a reviewing court would find the emergency situations exception applicable to on-site
arms control inspections. Moreover, the "exigency" that might be claimed to justify warrant-
less on-site inspections under the Draft Convention is one that would be created by the time
limits in the treaty itself, rather than something inherent in the threat posed to society by
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Court has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect commercial
property from government searches to the same extent as private
homes, 145 the Court has found the constitutional leeway to create an ex-
emption from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement where the
firm being searched is "pervasively regulated."' 146 Since the Reagan Ad-
ministration appears to base its assertion that private American chemical
companies could be inspected under the Draft Convention on the fact
that the chemical industry is "heavily regulated,"'1 47 it is fair to assume
that the federal government would seek to justify all three types of in-
spections by asserting that the firms are pervasively regulated in the con-
stitutional sense.
United States v. Biswell148 illustrates that the pervasively regulated in-
dustries exemption is best viewed as the result of an implied social bar-
gain.149 In Biswell, a pawn shop dealer who was licensed to sell sporting
chemical weapons. Cf. Note, Police Created Exigencies: Implications for the Fourth Amend-
ment, 37 SYRACUSE L. Rlv. 147 (1986). In any case, this is not the justification on which the
Reagan Administration seems to rely for its assertion that chemical industry property would
be subject to inspection under the Draft Convention.
The second exemption is the so-called "routine inspection" exemption. In Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, the Supreme Court considered whether a fire department should have
obtained a search warrant to reenter a burned-out building over two weeks after extinguishing
the blaze in order to investigate the possibility of arson. Id. at 511. In its opinion, the Court
distinguished between the kind of "programmatic" searches typified by routine building in-
spections and searches like the instant case, which it characterized as "responsive to individual
events." Id. at 507. Whereas constitutional reasonableness can be achieved in routine
searches by the "broad legislative or administrative guidelines specifying the purpose, fre-
quency, scope, and manner of conducting the inspections," id., investigatory fire searches were
found to be sufficiently focused that they justified the requirement of a warrant so that a magis-
trate could balance the "need for the intrusion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption to
the occupant on the other." Id. The Court thus indicated that a heavier constitutional burden
faces the government when it seeks to search without a warrant based on suspicion of some
criminal wrongdoing than when it seeks to perform a routine search. Id. See generally Note,
Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc- Probable Cause Require-
mentsfor Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 GEO. L.J. 1183 (1982) (detailed discussion of
different implications under Fourth Amendment of routine and nonroutine searches) [herein-
after Note, Administrative Agency Searches].
145. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
146. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); see also Note, Administrative
Agency Searches, supra note 144, at 1188-89.
147. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
148. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
149. The term "social bargain" means an unstated agreement between a citizen and the
government in which the citizen is permitted to carry on certain activities that otherwise
would be prohibited, in return for accepting restrictions on the enterprise that would be inap-
propriate for most undertakings. Such social bargains are often struck to enable citizens to
conduct activities that are unusually hazardous, but from which society as a whole benefits; the
additional regulation that is extracted in return by the government is intended to provide soci-
ety with a greater degree of protection than it would otherwise be entitled to receive. The term
"social contract" is not used in order to avoid the many philosophical controversies that it
engenders, although the notion of a social bargain is not unlike a social contract writ small.
Compare J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 112 (1971), with Lyons, Nature and Soundness
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weapons under the Gun Control Act of 1968150 was convicted of the
illegal possession of two sawed-off rifles. The weapons were discovered
by a Treasury Department agent during a surprise warrantless inspection
which was specifically authorized by the Act.' 5 ' The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the conviction, stating that
close scrutiny of [firearms] traffic is undeniably of central importance to
federal efforts to prevent violent crime... and inspection is a crucial part of
the regulatory scheme.... It is also plain that inspections for compliance
with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifi-
able expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to engage in this per-
vasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with
the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be
subject to effective inspection. 152
The Court analyzed Biswell's reasonable expectations of privacy as
though he had entered into an agreement with the government when he
obtained his federal license to sell guns. In return for the license, the
Court found that he had implicitly acceded to a greater level of govern-
ment intrusion than an unregulated line of business might involve. When
the Court balanced these limited privacy expectations against the great
value of warrantless searches in uncovering violations of the law, it had
"little difficulty" determining that the intrusion was constitutional de-
spite the absence of a warrant.1 53
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,' 54 the Supreme Court further developed
this social bargain theory by attempting to establish the point at which a
business becomes a party to the imputed agreement. The Court faced the
question whether the scheme of random warrantless administrative in-
spections created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA) satisfied the Fourth Amendment. On one extreme, the Court
noted, are businesses like firearms dealerships, where the proprietor has
"voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental
regulation."' 155 At the other end of the spectrum are those where the
proprietor is "not engaged in any regulated or licensed business.' 56 De-
termination of where OSHA-regulated businesses fall on this regulatory
of the Contract and Coherence Arguments, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF "A
THEORY OF JUSTICE" 149-60 (1974).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
151. 406 U.S. at 311-13.
152. Id. at 315, 316 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 317.
154. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).




continuum required the Court to scrutinize "the degree of federal in-
volvement in employee working circumstances."1 57
The Court noted that OSHA reached beyond pervasively regulated
businesses, like those contemplated in Biswell, to include "all businesses
in interstate commerce." 158 It concluded that none "but the most fic-
tional sense of voluntary consent to later searches [can] be found in the
single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce;
under current practice and law, few businesses can be conducted without
having some effect on interstate commerce."' 59 The Court thus made
clear that the nature of the business the government seeks to subject to a
warrantless search must be such that its owner has, in effect, consented
to such searches as a sort of regulatory cost of doing business.
The government argued that regulation of employee health and safety
in all businesses operating in interstate commerce was pervasive because
those firms with federal government contracts were already required,
under the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936, to comply with restrictions involv-
ing a minimum wage and maximum employee work hours. The Court
rejected this argument. Comparing the relatively short reach of the
Walsh-Healy Act to the expansion in "specificity and pervasiveness that
OSHA mandates," the Court concluded that the older statute had not
"prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for regulation of
working conditions to the minutest detail."' 60 In short, the Court de-
cided that federal regulation for limited purposes-minimum wage and
maximum hours-does not amount to pervasive regulation for the
broader purpose of dispensing with search warrants prior to OSHA in-
spections. Not all regulation is pervasive regulation.
In Donovan v. Dewey,16 1 the Court elaborated on the obligations of the
federal government under the fictional social bargain it had created to
justify warrantless searches of commercial property. The statute at issue
in Dewey, the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,162 provided for war-
rantless safety inspections of underground and surface mines. 163 The
plaintiff Secretary of Labor had appealed the denial of an injunction to
prevent the president of a quarrying company from refusing to admit the
Department's mine inspector. 64
157. Id. at 314.
158. Id. at 313-14.
159. Id. at 314.
160. Id.
161. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
162. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
163. 452 U.S. at 596.
164. Id. at 597-98.
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The Court reaffirmed that statutory inspection schemes could make
warrants unnecessary in limited circumstances. 165 At the same time, the
Court warned that "warrantless inspections of commercial property may
be constitutionally objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infre-
quent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no
real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by
government officials."' 166 The Court noted that its prior decisions
make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Con-
gress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to
further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is suffi-
ciently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property
cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic in-
spections undertaken for specific purposes.' 67
The "certainty and regularity"'' 68 of the inspection program, combined
with the "notorious history of serious accidents and unhealthful working
conditions"' 69 in the mining industry, tipped the balance between the
mine operators' privacy expectations and the enforcement needs of the
statute in favor of the latter.170
The Court considered three factors in deciding that the inspection pro-
gram was sufficiently well-defined. First, inspections were conducted of
all, rather than only some, of the subjects of the statute, and their fre-
quency was specified in the statute. 71 Second, the statute contained spe-
cific compliance requirements that were provided to each mine
operator.' 72 Finally, a mine operator could deny entry to an inspector;
the inspector then had to obtain an injunction in federal court against
future refusals. 73 In concluding that "the Act establishes a predictable
and guided federal regulatory presence,"' 1 4 the Court set the standard
for determining when warrantless searches of commercial property sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment's pervasively regulated industries
exemption.
165. Id. at 599-600.
166. Id. at 599 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 600.
168. Id. at 603.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 603-04.
172. Id. at 604.
173. Id. at 604-05.
174. Id. at 604.
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E. Analysis of the Constitutionality of On-Site Inspections Under the
Draft Convention
Both the subjects and the breadth of inspections under the Draft Con-
vention would differ among systematic international on-site inspections,
special on-site inspections, and ad hoc on-site inspections. An applica-
tion of the criteria developed by the Supreme Court to determine
whether these warrantless searches would survive a Fourth Amendment
challenge requires separate consideration of each type of inspection.
1. Systematic International On-Site Verification Inspections
Viewed through the lens of Biswell and Dewey, systematic interna-
tional on-site verification inspections-even though warrantless-ap-
pear to comply with the Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Systematic international on-site inspections would take
place at facilities and locations that have declared production and storage
of chemical weapons. 175 If they are privately owned, these entities, like
those in Biswell, surely are on notice that they have entered a business
that is heavily controlled by the federal government, and in which an
urgent public interest demands in return a high level of governmental
intrusion. Moreover, like the inspection scheme approved in Dewey, the
Draft Convention gives very specific parameters regulating most of the
occasions on which these kinds of inspections would take place.
Although the Draft Convention also permits some random inspections of
such firms, Biswell suggests that even surprise inspections of weapons
manufacturers would not violate the Fourth Amendment. Finally, like
the regulatory schemes in both Biswell and Dewey, the systematic inter-
national on-site verification scheme clearly would be central to the suc-
cess of the treaty.176
2. Special On-Site Inspections
If, as is assumed above, 177 special on-site inspections apply to all U.S.
chemical companies, regardless of whether they actually produce weap-
ons, and all privately owned firms holding government contracts, the
constitutionality of special on-site inspections is more questionable than
that of systematic international on-site inspections. The Supreme Court
decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 178 indicates that the chem-
175. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In addition, it appears that the so-called
"routine" exemption to the Fourth Amendment, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Michi-
gan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), would support warrantless systematic on-site inspections.
See supra note 144.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
178. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
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ical industry may not be, as claimed by the Reagan Administration, as
pervasively regulated as the gun and mining industries were found to be
in Biswell and Dewey. Furthermore, searches that would take place
under this provision are far less certain and regular than systematic inter-
national on-site inspections. Consequently, it is more likely that a war-
rant would be found to be a constitutional prerequisite to this type of
search. 179
The Dow case arose out of an investigation of the plaintiff chemical
manufacturer by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The EPA sought to determine whether the firm's power houses were
emitting excessive air pollutants. 8 0 Acting without a warrant, the EPA
hired an aerial photographer equipped with a $22,000 precision aerial
mapping camera to take pictures of Dow's premises. When Dow learned
of the overflight, it brought suit against the EPA, seeking to enjoin the
agency from "disseminating, releasing or copying the photographs al-
ready taken." 181
The Court held that the overflight was not a search and a warrant was
therefore unnecessary. 8 2 The opinion, however, reviewed the constitu-
tional standards for warrantless searches of commercial property and
concluded: "Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective ex-
pectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is
equally clear that that expectation is one society is prepared to
observe." 183
While the Court was referring to a single litigant in a dispute over a
domestic environmental statute-and not the entire chemical industry in
the context of a major arms control treaty-this language directly con-
tradicts the position of the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Dis-
armament that the chemical industry is so extensively regulated that it
should be considered "government controlled."' 18 4 To the extent that
special on-site inspections permit warrantless entries into chemical man-
179. The Supreme Court's decision in Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, would seem to argue against
warrantless special on-site inspections. See supra note 144.
180. 106 S. Ct. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1822 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 1827.
183. Id. at 1825 (citation omitted). The dissent agreed with the majority that a warrant
would be required to search the interior of Dow's buildings. Presenting a more detailed discus-
sion than the majority of the reasons why the exemption for pervasively regulated industries
did not apply in this case, the dissent emphasized that "the exception is based on a determina-
tion that the reasonable expectation of privacy that the owner of a business does enjoy may be
protected by the regulatory scheme itself." Id. at 1830-31 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Cf. Note, Administrative Searches-The Ninth Circuit Expands the Closely Regu-
lated Industry Exemption to the Fourth Amendment, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 973 (fishing vessels
subject to warrantless on-site inspections in order to determine whether porpoises were being
killed illegally).
184. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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ufacturing plants that are otherwise uninvolved in the chemical weapons
industry, Dow suggests that they would be unconstitutional.
Even if the language quoted above from Dow is discounted as dictum,
the pervasive regulation exemption to the warrant requirement may re-
quire expansion to encompass special on-site inspections. In both Biswell
and Dewey, the pervasive regulation justifying warrantless searches was
of activities directly in the line of business of the firms being inspected,
and was created in the federal statute authorizing such inspections as a
response to the nature of those activities. In contrast, the pervasive regu-
lation that is asserted to support warrantless special on-site inspections is
said to exist already, by virtue of other, presumably unrelated, federal
laws. 185
But since many chemical factories, such as pesticide or fertilizer pro-
ducers, have no connection to chemical weapons manufacturing, they
might not be considered to be on notice for constitutional purposes of on-
site inspection for chemical weapons involvement. The Court in Bar-
low's did not decide whether pervasive regulation in one area would jus-
tify warrantless inspections for other purposes. However, its refusal to
premise a determination that all employers in interstate commerce are
pervasively regulated on a federal regulatory statute that, on its face, af-
fected only government contractors strongly implies that pervasive regu-
lation in one area does not necessarily amount to pervasive regulation for
all possible governmental purposes. Therefore, a reviewing court would
have to decide whether the exemption requires some nexus between the
policy goals of the pervasive regulation and those said to justify the war-
rantless inspections.
Even if some or all of the chemical industry were found to be perva-
sively regulated, the almost complete absence of parameters in the Draft
Convention governing the conduct of warrantless searches might be con-
stitutionally fatal. Unlike the regularly scheduled safety inspections that
the Court approved in Dewey, special on-site inspections may be as fre-
quent or infrequent as the needs of the individual members of the Fact-
Finding Panel require. Moreover, the Draft Convention does not give the
subjects of those inspections any right to refuse entry; the easy access to
federal court which the statute in Dewey provided 186 would be unavaila-
ble. Special on-site inspections thus appear to suffer from being poten-
tially "so random, infrequent, or unpredictable"' 18 7 that the federal
government would be unable to live up to its obligations under the im-
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying note 173.
187. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981).
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plied social bargain that the Supreme Court has constructed to justify
warrantless searches of pervasively regulated businesses.
3. Ad Hoc On-Site Inspections
If special on-site inspections are of dubious constitutionality, ad hoc
on-site inspections are surely constitutionally deficient. The best argu-
ment for the constitutionality of ad hoc on-site inspections is that they
are not really warrantless searches at all because the Fact-Finding Panel
must approve a party's demand prior to such a search. 88 It could be
asserted that this process provides an effective substitute for a neutral
review of proposed searches as contemplated by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 189 In any case, the U.S. representative could always veto an unrea-
sonable inspection. 190
Supreme Court precedent concerning the separation of powers, how-
ever, provides little support for the proposition that an international or-
ganization could sufficiently simulate the constitutional protections
afforded Americans by the federal judiciary. As early as 1803, the Court
declared in Marbuiy v. Madison:
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon
the performance of that duty, it seems ... clear that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for
a remedy .... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is.191
As recently as 1974, the Court added, in United States v. Nixon:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the 'ju-
dicial power of the United States' vested in the federal courts by Art. III,
§ 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch
than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto
power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic
concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from
the scheme of a tripartite government. 192
A Court that is unwilling to permit decisions interpreting the U.S. Con-
stitution to be made by other branches of our own government seems
unlikely to allow that power to be delegated to an international Fact-
188. See supra text accompanying note 88.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 109-111.
190. See supra text accompanying note 90.
191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167, 177 (1803).
192. 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
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Finding Panel, whose only American representative would presumably
be a diplomat serving at the pleasure of the President.193
Even if an international organization could be empowered to evaluate
the reasonableness of on-site arms control inspections under the U.S.
Constitution, the review process contemplated for ad hoc on-site inspec-
tions in the proposed Chemical Weapons Treaty would probably be inad-
equate. Most important, although the U.S. representative could exercise
veto power over any proposed inspection, the Fact-Finding Panel on
which the representative serves would be constituted as part of a law
enforcement agency with a mission to "promote the verification of com-
pliance with the Convention." 194 This would create in the U.S. represen-
tative exactly the same kind of conflict of interest that the Supreme Court
has recognized as leading to bias on the part of domestic police in favor
of searches. 195 In Katz v. United States,1 96 the Court noted:
the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judi-
cial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police.... ." "Over
and over again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 1
97
The Fact-Finding Panel could not be expected to offer the type of protec-
tion against unreasonable searches provided by a court.
If review by the Fact-Finding Panel is not an effective substitute for a
warrant, then ad hoc on-site inspections suffer deficiencies similar to
those discussed above surrounding special on-site inspections. Because
ad hoc on-site inspections would apply to all "locations or facilities" not
covered by special on-site inspections, the subjects of ad hoc on-site in-
spections would not be entities manufacturing or storing chemical weap-
ons, 198 nor would they be under government control. Surely such
enterprises could not be on notice that being uninvolved in the chemical
weapons industry makes them fair game for warrantless searches to as-
sure U.S. compliance with a chemical weapons treaty. Finally, even if a
court were somehow to find that the firms to be inspected under this
provision are pervasively regulated, ad hoc on-site inspections are no
193. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)
with id. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring).
194. Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. VII(2).
195. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
196. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
197. Id. at 357 (citations and footnotes omitted; ellipses and brackets in original).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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more certain or regular than are special on-site inspections.1 99 Such
searches would stand an even slimmer chance of surviving constitutional
scrutiny where the contemplated search is of a "location or facility" that
is not commercial property. 2°
III. Minimizing Potential Fourth Amendment Conflicts
The preceding section establishes that under existing law, systematic
international on-site verification inspections are probably compatible
with the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionality of special on-site in-
spections is uncertain, however, and it is unlikely that an ad hoe on-site
inspection of certain facilities apparently covered by the Draft Conven-
tion would survive a Fourth Amendment challenge. If a U.S. court en-
joined the inspection process after the treaty had been ratified, the
199. Ad hoc on-site inspections resemble the general warrants that the King of England
relied upon to search the businesses of colonists before the Revolutionary War. It was the
reaction to such warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment:
An important forerunner of the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution,
the Virginia Bill of Rights, specifically opposed "general warrants, whereby an officer or
messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact com-
mitted." The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies imme-
diately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely
felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for
compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colo-
nists. [Tihe Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists'
experience with the writs of assistance ... [that] granted sweeping power to customs
officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (footnotes and citations omitted). The
Draft Convention, however, does restrict ad hoe on-site inspections to "locations" that "are
clearly defined." Draft Convention, supra note 6, annex II, B(H)(3)(c)-(d). The Draft Con-
vention urges that the enforcement agency administering the treaty make "arrangements" that
"limit intrusion to the level necessary to determine the facts," and narrow inspections "to
places relevant to determination of the facts." Id; see also supra note 113 (discussing whether
warrants might be intended as prerequisite to ad hoe on-site inspections); supra text accompa-
nying notes 190-92 (explaining why the review process by the Fact-Finding Panel would not be
an effective substitute for review of a proposed warrant by an American court).
200. A court is even less likely to approve ad hoc on-site inspections if the Draft Conven-
tion is read to include private homes among the "locations or facilities" they could reach. See
supra note 93 and accompanying text. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the
Supreme Court declared:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none
is the zone more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimen-
sions of an individual's home.... [T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.
Id. at 589-90; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement includes administrative searches of homes). The sorts of "exigent cir-
cumstances" that can justify a warrantless search include "violence .... [a] movable vehicle
.... an arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property." United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951). This definition implicitly assumes a case-by-case judi-
cial analysis of the facts of each search. The idea of an entire new category of warrantless
home searches is thus directly at odds with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
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international consequences could be significant. It is therefore appropri-
ate to analyze whether more constrained methods of arms control verifi-
cation would be more likely to clear the Fourth Amendment hurdle, as
well as whether government contracts or statutes could be changed to
avoid conflict between the right to be free from warrantless searches and
the national interest in mutually verifiable arms control agreements. 2
0
'
This analysis could assist verification not only of a chemical weapons
treaty, but of agreements limiting nuclear and conventional weapons as
well.
A. Remote Monitoring as an Alternative to On-Site Inspections
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States20 2 the Court held that "the tak-
ing of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable
airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. ' 20 3 The
Court thus opened the door to verification methods that are not searches
under the Fourth Amendment-methods that would not even raise the
question of whether warrants are needed.
The question in Dow was whether the company's outdoor plant site
was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection from government surveil-
lance using professional aerial photography equipment.20 4 Characteriz-
ing the dispute as line-drawing between the outdoor areas that are
entitled to "much the same kind of privacy as that covering the interior
of a structure" and those that are "open fields" which "do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is
intended to shelter from governmental interference or surveillance, '2
0 5
the Court emphasized that "[w]hat is observable by the public is observa-
ble without a warrant, by a Government inspector as well."'20 6 Noting
the large size of Dow's site, the firm's failure to shield its structures from
aerial viewing, and the fact that the photographs were taken from public
airspace where any airplane traveler could have viewed the facility, the
Court was not persuaded by the company's assertion of a privacy
interest.20 7
201. This analysis, of course, does not imply that these methods could suffice to verify a
given arms control treaty. That is a political and technical matter, as well as a legal one. This
section merely suggests approaches that maximize the constitutional acceptability of
verification.
202. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 180-83 for a summary of
the facts of this case.
203. 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
204. Id. at 1825.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 1826 (citation omitted).
207. Id. at 1826-27.
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The Court also devoted considerable discussion to the degree of tech-
nological sophistication of the airplane's photographic equipment:
Highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the
public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed ab-
sent a warrant. But the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate
details as to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give
EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited
to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere fact that
human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not
give rise to constitutional problems. 208
Thus, it appears that the Court has indicated that it will not require
search warrants under the Fourth Amendment where government aerial
photographers are located in public airspace, the facility is open to public
view, and the photographs taken lack a high degree of detail.
It seems apparent from this decision that any area to which the public
generally has access would be a constitutionally appropriate place to lo-
cate remote sensing devices. Under this test, a satellite would arguably
be an acceptable place from which to conduct arms control verification.
While it is true that the opinion in Dow singled out satellite technology as
a government surveillance technique that might be viewed as a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, one can imagine future
public access to orbital space comparable to that available today to air-
plane travelers. More important, the Court in Dow appears to have been
more concerned about the intrusive sensing devices than can secretly be
carried on board satellites than with the location of the satellites
themselves.
The opinion establishes a standard by which to evaluate whether a
given sensing device is sufficiently intrusive so that its operation would
amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment. In comparing the
operation of the aerial camera in Dow to the human eye, the Court iden-
tified human senses as the benchmark for making this determination.
The Court was willing to tolerate a sensing device that would provide
substantial enhancement of human vision,209 although it indicated that it
would review future cases in terms of how far beyond ordinary percep-
tual abilities the sensing device in question extended. Since machines
presumably can be designed to be incapable of picking up the breadth of
information that a human being can extract from a given situation, this
approach may permit relatively powerful remote monitoring devices to
208. Id. (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 1829 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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survey commercial property without crossing the Fourth Amendment
threshold.
Yet the opinion in Dow seems anomalous in equating "highly sophisti-
cated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public"210 to
devices that would intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
intrusiveness of mechanical devices can be thought of as being comprised
of two elements: sensitivity and selectivity. Sensitivity is "the ability of
the output of a device or system to respond to an input stimulus. '2 1 1
Selectivity, in this context, is the ability to receive some signals while
rejecting others.212 A device that is sensitive but not selective is generally
more intrusive than one that is both sensitive and selective because the
unselective device will detect a wider range of data than its selective
counterpart. For example, a microphone that picks up a broad spectrum
of sound (i.e., is relatively unselective at a given decibel level) is more
intrusive that one which only picks up high-frequency sounds (i.e., is
relatively selective).
Devices that closely emulate the human senses may be more intrusive
than those that are more selective, even if the more selective devices also
are more sensitive. This is because a device designed so that it selectively
detects only evidence of a violation of the law could not gather the
breadth of wholly irrelevant data that a more human-like instrument
could collect from the same scene. Since Supreme Court precedent im-
plies that no reasonable expectation of privacy inheres in evidence of ille-
gal conduct,213 a perfectly selective device could be constitutionally
unintrusive, where an unselective device resembling human senses would
invade privacy. For example, if one can imagine a machine with the
ability to detect and measure from an airplane in very small concentra-
tions the extent of the supposed air pollutants that the EPA sought to
locate in Dow-and only those pollutants-Dow Chemical Company
would have had a less compelling claim that the data thus gathered com-
promised its privacy than it had regarding the photographs in issue in the
case. The photographs depicted the air pollution plumes at the factory
site similarly to the way a person with especially good eyes would see
them from an airplane, along with all kinds of information pertaining to
210. Id. at 1826.
211. McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology, Sensitivity 272 (6th ed. 1987).
212. More precisely, selectivity is "the ability of a radio receiver to separate a desired
signal frequency from other signal frequencies some of which may differ only slightly from the
desired value." Id., Selectivity, at 243.
213. Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812-13 (1986); Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S.
170, 182 n.13 (1984) ("Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment
should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent choose to erect barriers
and post 'No Trespassing' signs.").
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trade secrets. Our hypothetical air pollution detector, in contrast, would
only have revealed data on one aspect of the operations (albeit in more
detail), in which a reasonable expectation of privacy would be much
more difficult to contrive. Thus, instruments designed to be more selec-
tive than the equivalent human senses might pose less of a threat to
Fourth Amendment values.214
However, such selective devices may be both more sophisticated and
less available to the public. Not only can selectivity sometimes be an
expensive and difficult attribute to produce, but this characteristic may
limit the size of the economic market for its use. Thus, few people may
come into contact with such advanced devices, but, contrary to Dow,
they may be less intrusive than unselective and more commonly available
counterparts. A more precise formulation of what the Court in Dow
seems to have intended would take account of the fact that technical
sophistication does not always amount to intrusiveness.
Dow creates the possibility that using remote monitoring instruments
to verify arms control treaties may pass constitutional review where on-
site inspections could not.2 15 Since the major Soviet objection to on-site
inspections has been fear that such visits would be used for intelligence
gathering, selective remote monitoring devices may be greeted with a
great deal less trepidation. 216 These devices could pave the way for an
internationally acceptable means of treaty verification by allaying Soviet
fears of espionage as well as complying with Fourth Amendment restric-
tions against government intrusion.
B. Contractual Consent to Special On-Site Inspections
While federal government contractors are a small subset of the firms
that would be subject to special on-site inspections under Article X of the
Draft Convention,217 modifying the treaty proposal to include only fed-
eral contractors might avoid the problem of relying on the "pervasive
regulation" exemption to justify some of the contemplated warrantless
on-site inspections. It is possible that contractors could be explicitly re-
quired to consent to such searches under the terms of any contract they
214. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983).
215. One example of a selective and sophisticated device with application to arms control
verification might be a seismometer, which is well suited for detecting and measuring under-
ground nuclear explosions. See Evernden & Marsh, Yields of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Tests,
PHYSICS TODAY, Aug. 1987, at 37; Archambeau, Verifying A Test Ban: A New Approach to
Monitoring Underground Nuclear Tests, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Winter 1986,
at 18.
216. See Adam, supra note 5, at 44.
217. Article X subjects to special on-site inspection all "facilities controlled by the Govern-
ment of a Party." See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
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enter into with the federal government. This subsection will analyze
whether the Constitution erects a barrier to requiring such consent as a
condition of contracting with the government, as well as whether a court
is likely to find consent in existing government contracts.
In Zap v. United States,2 18 the Supreme Court decided that a govern-
ment contractor could waive its Fourth Amendment right to protection
from warrantless searches. The petitioner's contract with the U.S. Navy
included a clause permitting the government to inspect his accounts and
records. When government agents subsequently began a warrantless au-
dit of his records, Zap protested the search.219 These records were cru-
cial to the government's case against him for presenting false claims,
220
and Zap moved to suppress the evidence the warrantless search provided.
Holding that the search was valid, the Court stated: "[W]hen petitioner,
in order to obtain the government's business, specifically agreed to per-
mit inspection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such
claim to privacy which he otherwise might have had as respects business
documents related to those contracts. ' 221 The Court thus looked to the
terms of the contract to determine whether the contractor had consented
to the warrantless search, and did not even require that the waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights be explicit.
Furthermore, the federal government can demand commitment to a
contract clause that is itself unrelated to the goods or services being pro-
vided under the contract. Fullilove v. Klutznick 222 tested the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute requiring that a percentage of all government
funds for public works construction projects be awarded to minority
business enterprises. The decision stressed:
Congress has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compli-
ance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.
This Court has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use of
this technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate vol-
untarily with federal policy.223
218. 328 U.S. 624 (1946), judgment vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per
curiam). That the reasoning in Zap retained its vitality despite vacation of the judgment is
confirmed by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 22 (1967), where the Court stated:
"A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624...
219. 328 U.S. at 627.
220. Id. at 624.
221. Id. at 628.
222. 448 U.S. 448 (1986).
223. Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
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The Court concluded that the goal of expanding minority access to fed-
eral funds in this manner is a valid exercise of the Congressional Spend-
ing Power because Congress is empowered to regulate minority
subcontracting by private government contractors directly, even without
resort to a contract clause.224
Requiring waiver of Fourth Amendment protections against warrant-
less on-site verification inspections as a condition of contracting with the
government would go beyond the kind of contract clause approved in
either Zap or Fullilove. First, it would be a contract term unrelated to
the performance of the contract itself, thus requiring a court to extend
the holding in Zap to embrace searches beyond the scope of the "busi-
ness documents related to those contracts. ' 225 Second, it would require
the waiver of a constitutional right, a situation which Fullilove did not
present. Indeed, it might be argued that Fullilove is distinguishable be-
cause Congress might not be empowered directly to legislate the warrant-
less inspection of government contractors, as it could the racial
subcontracting practices of public works contractors. Whether the Court
would be prepared to combine the holdings in Zap and Fullilove to ap-
prove warrantless special on-site inspections of government contractors
remains to be seen.
Snepp v. United States 226 suggests that the national security implica-
tions of an arms control treaty might bridge this gap. In Snepp, the
Court faced a dispute between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and former agent Snepp. After resigning his position, Snepp
wrote a book about the CIA which he refused to submit to the CIA for
prepublication review as required by his employment contract.2 27 The
Court held that the damages due to the CIA for breach of the contract
should include the profits from the sale of the book,228 and reaffirmed the
Court of Appeals finding that the contract was valid even though it re-
stricted his First Amendment right to free speech.229 The Court noted
the government's "compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of
information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelli-
gence service," and found that "the agreement that Snepp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. ' '230
224. Id. at 475-76.
225. 328 U.S. at 628.
226. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
227. Id. at 507-08.
228. Id. at 516.
229. Id. at 509 n.3.
230. Id. (citation omitted).
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Requiring consent to warrantless special on-site inspections as a condi-
tion of contracting with the government has a much more tenuous rela-
tionship to most government purchases than the relationship between the
condition in Snepp's contract and his employment. It can be inferred
from this decision, however, that the national- security interest in arms
control would be a powerful argument in favor of the constitutionality of
such contractual conditions. This analysis suggests that a consent clause
could probably be constitutionally included in government contracts.
Assuming that some kind of clause consenting to special on-site in-
spections can constitutionally be included in government contracts, it
seems unlikely that the government could rely on the inspection clauses
in existing contracts. A similar problem was at issue in Bowsher v. Merck
& Co., Inc.231 In Bowsher, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
sought access to confidential cost records of a pharmaceutical firm which
sold goods to the federal government under a contract containing statu-
torily-required clauses "granting the Comptroller General the right to
examine any directly pertinent records involving transactions relating to
the contract. '232 The Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff pharmaceuti-
cal firm's refusal to grant the requested access because the records con-
tained "indirect costs" such as research and development expenses.
These expenses were deemed to be separate from costs related to the par-
ticular contracts. 233 The opinion noted that the purpose of the statute
requiring the inclusion of the contract clause in question was "to assess
the reasonableness of the prices paid by the Government and to detect
inefficiency and wastefulness. '234 The Court concluded that in enacting
this law, "Congress was apparently willing to forgo the benefits that
might be gained from permitting the GAO broad access to the contrac-
tor's business records in order to protect those contractors from far-
reaching government scrutiny of their nongovernmental affairs." 235 If
the Court was not persuaded to interpret the statute in question to allow
a U.S. agency-which was empowered to look at the records of direct
costs attributable to the government contracts at issue-to examine indi-
rect cost records, it is unlikely that the Court would interpret analogous
government contracts236 to allow the agent of an international organiza-
tion the kind of free reign contemplated by special on-site inspections in
231. 460 U.S. 824 (1983).
232. Id. at 827-28.
233. Id. at 840-841.
234. Id. at 843.
235. Id. at 842.
236. See, eg., 48 C.F.R. § 52.246-8(c) (1986). This section sets out a standard contract
clause to be included in cost reimbursement contracts for research and development under the
Federal Acquisition Regulations System, and states, inter alia:
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the Draft Convention. It is therefore prudent to assume that a clause
expressly granting such consent would be required.
C. Minimizing Fourth Amendment Problems By Statute
If remote means of treaty verification cannot be found that eliminate
the need for intrusive on-site inspections, and a need is found to inspect
firms other than those that would consent to warrantless searches in or-
der to do business with the federal government, an alternative means of
minimizing the possibility of a wrenching constitutional challenge might
be through new federal legislation limiting remedies for Fourth Amend-
ment violations so as not to defeat the purposes of the Draft Conven-
tion's on-site inspections. This analysis first requires an understanding of
the extent to which such a convention would entail separate federal legis-
lation to implement its provisions. Following this discussion, I explore
possibilities for a federal statute whose specific goal would be to define
remedies for Fourth Amendment violations that would not undermine
the purposes of on-site inspection.
The question of whether an arms control treaty would be self-execut-
ing, i.e., would not require passage of a separate federal statute to imple-
ment its provisions, is important for determining how to structure the
remedies that might be available for Fourth Amendment violations aris-
ing out of on-site inspections of private firms2 37 If the Draft Convention
is non-self-executing, then a political forum involving both Houses of
Congress is guaranteed for debating and deciding the proper outcome of
the conflict between the need for on-site inspections and the constitu-
tional right to be free from unreasonable searches. On the other hand, if
the Draft Convention is self-executing, then affirmative Congressional ac-
tion beyond the treaty ratification process would be required to legislate a
resolution of this potential dispute.2 38
The test for determining whether a treaty is self-executing is not well
defined.239 The overriding consideration is said to be the intent of the
parties to the agreement, although treaty language often omits any state-
ment in this regard.24° However, when a treaty requires the United
The Government has the right to inspect and test all work called for by the contract, to
the extent practicable at all places and times, including the period of performance, and in
any event before acceptance. The Government may also inspect the plant or plants of the
Contractor or its subcontractors engaged in the contract performance. The Government
shall perform inspections and tests in a manner that will not unduly delay the work.
237. See generally, HENKIN, supra note 98, at 156-67.
238. For example, the United States Senate could express a reservation that such a treaty
would not take effect until the enactment of implementing legislation. Id. at 159.




States to perform a future act-especially one generally accepted as re-
quiring explicit Congressional action, such as appropriating funds, en-
forcing a criminal law, or declaring war-then implementing federal
legislation is a prerequisite. 241
Viewed in this rather diffuse light, it appears that the on-site inspection
provisions of the Draft Convention, or any other arms control treaty
granting foreign parties a similar right to conduct on-site inspections,
would be self-executing. First, while the text of the Draft Convention
does not specifically state whether it is to be self-executing, 242 the on-site
inspection provisions do not require the United States to perform future
acts in this country; rather, they confer rights on other parties. Second,
the obligations that would be imposed on the United States are not
among those that are generally accepted as requiring explicit congres-
sional action. Third, the subject matter involves both national security
and foreign affairs, where the power of the President is at it zenith. It is
fair to assume that any federal legislation to mitigate the potential con-
flict between the on-site inspection provisions in the Draft Convention
and the Fourth Amendment would have to be initiated in Congress,
apart from the ratification process itself.
A federal statute intended to mitigate constitutional conflict between
the Fourth Amendment and on-site arms control inspections would have
to limit the availability of injunctions to prevent an unconstitutional in-
spection pursuant to a treaty. If a statute were to make damages the
only available remedy, then the federal government could simply "buy
itself out" 243 of the potential embarrassment of a federal court enjoining
an international organization from carrying out the terms of an arms
control treaty. Such a statute, if constitutional, would largely resolve the
problems identified above. This section analyzes whether such a limita-
tion on remedies would be constitutionally acceptable.
It is important at the outset to distinguish between denial of court ju-
risdiction to hear a constitutional claim and limitation of the available
remedies. No statute that purported to eliminate court jurisdiction to
241. Id. at 159-60. See Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings on Executive N Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations (Part 1-Administration Witnesses), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-10
(1977) (statement of Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States), reprinted in 2 M.
GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 339-48 (1980).
242. The text of the Draft Convention offers little support for either position. Article XII
requires each Party to "take any measures necessary in accordance with its constitutional
processes to implement this Convention." Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. XlI. But the
very question that must be decided to determine whether the Draft Convention would be self-
executing is what the constitutional test mandates.
243. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1563 (1972).
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hear a plaintiff's claim seeking relief from alleged unconstitutional con-
duct could be expected to be upheld.244 Congress, however, is empow-
ered by the Constitution to legislate new remedies to constitutional
violations.245 In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,246 the Supreme Court
wrote:
In providing remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases and con-
troversies in the constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its dele-
gated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress
is authorized to establish. Exercising this control of practice and procedure
the Congress is not confined to traditional forms or traditional reme-
dies.... In dealing with methods within its sphere of remedial action the
Congress may create and improve as well as abolish or restrict.247
Thus, Congress has broad power to enact a federal statute providing
other remedies besides injunctions for the putative victims of unconstitu-
tional on-site arms control inspections.
One possible approach would be to amend the Federal Tort Claims
Act.248 At present, this statute provides for recovery of damages for Biv-
ens-type constitutional violations from "investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States government. '249 However, by its terms, it
might not apply to employees of the Technical Secretariat. Therefore,
this statute could be changed to provide explicitly for recovery of dam-
ages for unconstitutional on-site arms control inspections.
The harder question is whether the power to provide such new reme-
dies carries with it the authority to eliminate injunctive relief at the same
time. The Court has repeatedly stated that the availability of a damages
remedy under the Bivens doctrine250 may be limited by Congress.25 1 In
Bush v. Lucas,252 which denied the plaintiff a damages remedy, the Court
presented its most recent discussion of how it would approach the issue
of statutory limitation of remedies:
When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate
its intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even
244. See, e.g., Redish & Woods, supra note 115, at 76-81.
245. See Dellinger, supra note 243, at 1543-52.
246. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
247. Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
248. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (Supp. 1987).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1987); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20
(1980).
250. See supra note 116.
251. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 18-19; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-46
(1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396-97 (1971). Rotenberg, supra note 116, at 91-95, presents an excellent discussion of the
evolution in the Court's view of the relationship between statutory and judicial remedies for
constitutional violations.
252. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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by the statutory remedy itself, that the courts' power should not be exer-
cised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts
must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a
common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special fac-
tors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal
litigation.253
The Court openly invited Congress to substitute its own remedy for un-
constitutional conduct in place of those remedies the judiciary would
otherwise provide.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons254 indirectly suggests that this deference
to Congress might translate into a willingness to uphold a statute depriv-
ing plaintiffs of the right to obtain an injunction against an unconstitu-
tional on-site inspection. In Lyons, the Court held that the plaintiff did
not have standing to obtain an injunction against the Los Angeles Police
Department's practice of using chokeholds during routine arrests.255
While the decision did not actually reach the question of the appropriate
remedy, the tone of the Court's opinion reveals no particular attachment
to injunctions as a remedy.256 For example, the Court emphasized that a
damages remedy would sufficiently deter future unconstitutional conduct
even if injunctive relief were unavailable.2 57
Nevertheless, the outcome of a constitutional challenge to a statute
eliminating injunctive relief cannot be guaranteed. Neither Bush nor Ly-
ons is directly on point. In addition, the view that the remedy for a con-
stitutional violation can be determined exclusively by Congress is
disputed by a number of commentators, who have argued that the Con-
stitution independently obligates the judiciary to select the most appro-
priate remedy for a constitutional violation, regardless of what Congress
may legislate.258 Therefore, developing a federal statute to defuse the
253. Id. at 378.
254. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
255. Id. at 105-110.
256. See Rotenberg, supra note 116, at 102-03 (discussing how the Court in Lyons might
have fashioned an injunction in this case had it chosen to do so).
257. Id. at 112-13.
258. See, e.g., Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the
Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984):
If plaintiff is afforded a remedy under the legislative scheme, then the court should inde-
pendently determine whether the remedy adequately vindicates plaintiff's constitutional
rights.... [I]f an individual's constitutional rights have not yet been violated, but the risk
to him is sufficiently great that he meets the requirements of standing, a case or contro-
versy, and the like, the relief afforded should take the form of prospective relief. A legis-
lated remedy not 'facing in the right direction' would be constitutionally inadequate.
Id. at 283 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted); Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 17, 85 (1981) ("[F]orbidding the federal courts to issue all constitutionally adequate
remedies for a particular category of claims raises serious problems.... [T]he court in ques-
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constitutional confrontation inherent in on-site inspection schemes
would require great care.259
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether Congress would vote to ap-
prove such a statute. The restriction of remedies for constitutional viola-
tions has aroused considerable Congressional controversy in the context
of proposals to alter the exclusionary rule, to curtail federal court en-
forcement of prohibitions on prayer in public schools, and to prevent
federal courts from restricting state abortion regulatory laws. 260 The pri-
vate firms whose right to injunctive relief would be limited could be ex-
pected to resist. Thus, while the Court has indicated a willingness to
entertain statutory remedies for constitutional violations that substitute
for those that the judiciary might otherwise provide, Congress may be
unwilling to approve them in the first place.
A bill to validate warrantless on-site arms control inspections might
stimulate a searching inquiry into the entire subject. In view of the im-
portance of on-site inspections both to national security and to constitu-
tional jurisprudence, the public debate this could engender would be
valuable. A decision on how best to balance these important concerns
should be made with the broadest possible input.
Conclusion
On-site arms control inspections are a double-edged shield. They may
offer greater assurance that the parties to an arms control treaty are com-
plying with the treaty's provisions. At the same time, however, they in-
crease the risk of intrusion into the privacy of those to be inspected.
tion must be empowered to grant relief that is at least reasonably effective.") (footnote omit-
ted); Dellinger, supra note 243, at 1563:
The fourth amendment does not grant the government the discretion to decide whether
the benefits of infringing the public's right to be protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures are worth some expenditure of the public's funds; the language of the amendment
is an affirmative command. It is therefore doubtful that the substitution of a claim against
the government for the exclusionary rule in all cases would provide equally effective vindi-
cation of the constitutional interests thus protected, and it is therefore doubtful that such
a substitution would be constitutionally valid.
259. Rotenberg, supra note 116, at 108-09, suggests:
The Court needs to rethink the role of Congress concerning private remedies for constitu-
tional wrongs. Ideally, the Court should protect remedies from congressional restric-
tions-whether they take the form of jurisdictional, substantive right, or remedy
limitation. . . . The suggested limitation on Congress is only directed to its power to
reduce private remedies below a due process minimum of appropriate relief. It is conceiv-
able, therefore, that Congress could legislate appropriate relief in such a way that the
Supreme Court would defer to congressional judgment in establishing an orderly remedial
package.
260. See supra sources cited in note 258.
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The Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, pro-
posed by the United States in 1984, includes on-site inspection provisions
that raise serious Fourth Amendment questions. Insofar as the draft
treaty language, the proposed annexes, and contemporary statements by
American officials do not mention that obtaining a search warrant is a
precondition for carrying out any of the three types of inspection which
would be permitted, it must be assumed that the treaty does not intend to
require search warrants. Thus, if the Draft Convention were to be rati-
fied, its terms would not contemplate that a U.S. court could interpose
the neutral review process ordinarily required by the Fourth Amendment
prior to forced entry of private American commercial property by offi-
cials of an international organization.
It is possible that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would
not be an obstacle to such a treaty because searches involving foreign
affairs may be exempt from the usual warrant requirement. This difficult
issue has been explicitly avoided by the Supreme Court, and the lower
courts that have addressed it have split over how to strike the balance
between the deference due the Executive Branch in matters involving for-
eign affairs and the privacy rights of citizens. If the Draft Convention
enters into force, a reviewing court could be faced with the unpalatable
choice of approving wide-ranging warrantless inspections by foreigners,
or ruling that the key enforcement mechanism of an arms control treaty
is unconstitutional.
Another exemption developed by the Supreme Court to permit war-
rantless searches of commercial property requires that the firms subject
to inspection be part of a "pervasively regulated" industry. The case law
in this area indicates that the determination of whether a given industry
is pervasively regulated requires consideration of whether a social bar-
gain can be implied between the federal government and the industry, in
which the industry is regarded as having consented to warrantless inspec-
tions as a regulatory cost of doing business. Under this exception, the
government inspections must be carried out pursuant to a carefully delin-
eated inspection scheme embodied in law, which assures that inspections
are both certain and regular.
Two of the three types of on-site inspections contained in the Draft
Convention appear to be constitutionally defective under the pervasively
regulated exemption to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
While the test for pervasive regulation appears to be met by the firms
that would be subject to systematic international on-site verification in-
spections, the same cannot be said for those that would be searched
under the Draft Convention's special and ad hoc on-site inspection provi-
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sions. Language in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 261 contradicts the
notion put forward by American officials that special on-site inspections
of the domestic chemical industry would be permissible because the in-
dustry is heavily regulated. The case against ad hoc on-site inspections is
even stronger because the subjects of these inspections would be those
least involved in the chemical weapons industry. Moreover, special and
ad hoc on-site inspections are consciously designed to permit open-ended
inspections on "short notice," and are neither certain nor regular.
Two methods of arms control verification suggested in this article
could help avoid these legal problems. First, remote monitoring con-
ducted from areas to which the general public has access with instru-
ments that are not intrusive appears to be a promising starting point.
Remote monitoring might have the added advantage of accommodating
Soviet worries about espionage. Second, it is likely that federal govern-
ment contractors could legally be induced to consent to on-site inspec-
tions in their contracts with the government, although this is more
problematic with existing contractors insofar as their old contracts would
probably require modification.
It is also time to recognize that effective arms control verification will
require public involvement. If on-site inspections are a desirable form of
verifying future treaties, then their impact on American society and busi-
ness should be understood and evaluated by elected officials. Indeed, the
Supreme Court may be more likely to uphold an on-site inspection
scheme if Congress has carefully considered and approved-even if it has
chosen to limit-the remedies that could be obtained for unreasonable
searches. Therefore, federal legislation should be drafted detailing how
such inspections should be carried out and outlining the remedies avail-
able in lawsuits contesting the constitutionality of on-site inspections.
As the nations of the world grow more interdependent, it is inevitable
that the United States will face difficult choices between the benefits of
international accord and the unique protections provided by the Consti-
tution. This analysis demonstrates that even the most universally sought
goal may pose contradictions that our form of government is hard-
pressed to resolve. Realistic expectations and public debate are the most
promising tools to put to the task.
261. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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